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1.	The	welfare	state	in	a	modern	society	
 
The welfare state is an essential institution in any modern society. In Western Europe, the first basic 
pillars of social protection emerged around 1900, but the modern welfare state – a term coined in 
the early 1940s – developed from the 1950s to the 1970s. Social protection was extended to a 
broader range of social risks and services, coverage was widened to most of the population, and 
compensation levels came to reach well above subsistence level. As a consequence, tax extraction 
reached between one third and one half of the economy (GDP), occasionally more. Since the 1980s 
welfare states have continued to expand, but typically without raising the rate of taxation.  
 
Welfare states have also developed in recently industrialized countries and in former communist 
countries, following the transition to market economy. Among significant “newcomers” China 
started developing a modern welfare state in the 1990s. Taking a broad view, the welfare state 
seems intrinsically linked to market economy and industrialism, as claimed by functionalist writers 
more than 50 years ago (Wilensky & Lebaux, 1958). However, different welfare models or “welfare 
regimes” can be traced back to the formative period. Since the 1980s or 1990s, most welfare states 
have undergone significant restructuring, recalibration or even transformation, but this has not 
eliminated “regime” differences.   
 
 
Defining	the	welfare	state	
 
What is, exactly, a welfare state? Actually, the concept is not very often defined, but a long 
definition provided by historian Asa Briggs would seem to grasp the essence quite adequately, even 
if it might contain a British/Scandinavian bias and appear a bit ambitious: 
 
“A welfare state is a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through politics and 
administration) in an effort to modify the play of the market forces in at least three directions  
-  first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of the market 
value of their work or their property;  
-  second, by narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet 
certain “social contingencies” (for example, sickness, old age and unemployment) which lead 
otherwise to individual and family crisis; and  
-  third, by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best 
standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services.” (Briggs, 1961) 
 
In short, the welfare state modifies the impact of the market, by providing some sort of minimum 
guarantee (mitigating poverty); covering a range of social risks (security), and providing certain 
services (health care, child and elder care, etc.) – at the best standards available. Welfare states 
differ as regards the level of ambition and the mix between these aspects: Coverage may include a 
broad or a narrow range of risks and services, and minima may alleviate poverty or aim at providing 
equality (see welfare regimes below). Briggs’ definition is related to the tradition of thinking social 
policy in terms of citizenship (as the founding fathers – especially TH Marshall and Richard 
Titmuss at the LSE, and later scholars like Walter Korpi and Gøsta Esping-Andersen).   
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The	welfare	state	as	a	response	to	modernization	&	conflict	
 
There are several types of explanations of welfare state development. As hinted at above, 
“structural” explanations link the welfare state to market economy, industrialization and 
modernization (Wilensky, 1974). The welfare state alleviates the inequality and insecurity of 
modern capitalist, industrial society. Fulfilling these needs, the welfare state also serves to maintain 
social cohesion. In addition to such functionalist thinking (explaining why the welfare state is 
“necessary” for society), a conflict approach would emphasize (class) interests. The welfare state is 
linked to the emergence of an industrial working class, its organization in trade unions and Social 
Democratic parties, and to class and party alliances with old or new middle class groups. In this 
power resource perspective, the welfare state (and different welfare regimes) is a product of interest 
conflicts, more specifically, of class struggle and class alliances (Korpi, 1974, 1980, 1983; Esping-
Andersen, 1990).  
 
In addition to such structural explanations, other scholars (following the pioneering work of Heclo, 
1974; see also Beland & Cox, 2011) have underlined the role of ideas (often transferred from one 
country to another), and of institutions. As regards institutions, it is argued that welfare states 
crystallize in different regimes – “frozen landscapes” that resist change (Pierson, 1994), or at least 
develop in regime-specific ways when exposed to exogenous pressure (Swank, 2001; Kautto & 
Kvist, 2002). 
 
Among the structural explanations of welfare reform we find changing family structures, ageing 
populations, globalisation, migration, etc. But again, ideational and institutional theories are highly 
important in explaining change. 
 
 
The	key	issue	of	modern	politics		
 
As one quarter to one third of GDP is allocated to collective welfare schemes (narrowly defined), it 
is the core policy issue in modern societies. In broad terms, welfare policy would even include 
education, making its significance even larger. Moreover, some of the most basic issues in the 
economic field (economic policy, tax policy etc.) concerns trade-offs between private and collective 
consumption, and between equality and efficiency.  
 
By the same token, the welfare state is of key importance to the living conditions of any individual. 
Services are provided from the cradle to the grave – from child care to elderly care; as a giant 
insurance system, the welfare state protects against social risks throughout the life course; and it 
provides redistribution of income and life chances. This is particularly outspoken in the welfare 
states of Scandinavia and Western Europe. 
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2.	Welfare	regimes	‐	different	principles	of	solidarity	
 
A crucial point of modern welfare state theory is that welfare states not only differ regarding public 
expenditure levels, but even more in institutional terms: What are the underlying principles of 
solidarity behind the rules of eligibility (who should receive support) and entitlements (how much)? 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) coined the names of three ideal-typical welfare (state) regimes: The 
Liberal, Social Democratic and Conservative regimes (Figure 1).  
 
Esping-Andersen’s ideal types builds on Richard Titmuss’ (1974: 30-32) distinctions between three 
different principles of welfare: the residual model, the institutional model and the industrial 
achievement-performance model. However, Esping-Andersen named them according to the 
political forces behind them. As we do not find the association between regimes and political parties 
that straightforward we prefer the labels: Residual, universal and corporatist welfare model. At 
least these terms refer to the dependent variable and not to the (presumed) independent variable. It 
should be mentioned, however, that there are many names, in particular for the corporatist/ 
conservative/ industrial performance-achievement model.  
 
The corporatist model is also referred to as the social insurance model, as the Christian Democratic 
welfare model (van Kersbergen, 1995), or the Bismarckian welfare state (Palier, 2010). The 
German chancellor Otto von Bismarck was the first to introduce mandatory social insurance in the 
1880s. These insurances were mainly financed by social contributions paid jointly by workers and 
their employers. The label “corporatist” denotes that insurances are typically administered jointly 
by representatives of the employers, the workers and the state. “Performance-achievement” refers to 
the principle that rights depend on contributions – most significantly in the field of pensions. In 
other words, there is reciprocity between contributions and entitlements. The label “Conservative” 
is consistent with the fact that these systems were not aimed at equality, but at security (in 
accordance with people’s position in the social hierarchy). Risk sharing across classes was intended 
to be small. Initially, corporatist schemes typically covered only particular categories of workers, 
but after World War II, coverage was gradually extended to (nearly) the entire working population.  
 
Universal welfare states started as residual ones. Usually, the source of financing was taxes rather 
than contributions. The Danish old age support of 1891 was deliberately designed to be different 
from the first old age and disability insurance introduced by Bismarck two years earlier. The Danish 
scheme was targeted at old people1 who could not provide for themselves. The criteria and size of 
benefits were left to the discretion of local authorities until 1922 when “old age support” was 
renamed “old age allowance”, and eligibility and entitlements were fixed in the law. From the very 
origin, however, the Danish welfare state included all citizens, regardless of employment record and 
gender. Most German insurances only covered manual workers – but the pension scheme covered 
nearly all employees. When New Zealand followed as the third country in 1898, it emulated the 
Danish old age support scheme, but entitlements were more clearly specified in the law. Like 
Denmark, New Zealand was less industrialised and strongly reliant on agriculture. 
 
Like in corporatist welfare states – and even more – coverage in what became universal welfare 
states was gradually extended to the entire population. Targeting the poor was economically 
necessary from the outset, but the division between a universal and residual model took place 
decades later and was a matter of political choice.  
                                                          
1 The age limit in Denmark was 60 years; in Germany it was initially 70, but the scheme included disability pension. 
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Figure 1. Three welfare models: Corporatist, Universal and Residual. 
 
Mandatory social insurance 
Financed by social contributions 
Typically for employed manual 
workers 
  
Support for the poor 
Typically tax financed 
For all citizens, but only according to need 
 
↓ 
  
↓ 
 
↓ 
    
Gradually extended to all social 
groups at the labour market  
Gradually extended to all citizens 
 
Still targeted the poor. 
Means-tested 
           
CORPORATIST MODEL 
 
UNIVERSAL MODEL 
 
RESIDUAL MODEL 
(conservative model; 
Bismarck-model; 
Social insurance model; 
Performance-achievement model) 
 
(social democratic model; 
institutional model)  
(liberal model) 
           
”People’s insurance” 
Redistribution from everybody to everybody 
High taxes 
 
”Protection against poverty” 
Means-tested support 
Low taxes 
Rights based on contributions 
 
Rights based on citizenship 
 
Rights based on need 
Benefits according to contributions 
Security according to social status  
Equality as citizens 
 
Safety net for the poor 
 
 
Both corporatist and universal welfare states are encompassing social insurance systems that take 
care of social risk and services for most of the population throughout the life course. Residual 
welfare states are based on the conviction that people should handle most of their welfare needs 
themselves; the role of the state should mainly be confined to providing a safety net for the poor. 
 
This completes the division into three welfare regimes. These are ideal types, that is, “pure” types 
or theoretical constructs. They illustrate the basic ideas and the mechanisms (the modus operandi) 
of different welfare principles. Next, they serve as measuring points for description of actual 
welfare systems where principles are mixed. The Nordic countries, however, largely follow the 
universal model; Continental European welfare states adhere to the corporatist model; and Anglo 
Saxon welfare states to the residual one. A “Southern European” model is sometimes presented as a 
regime of its own (Ferrera, 1996), sometimes as a sub-species of corporatism.  
 
As regards the administration of the corporatist model, there is a huge variation. Administration can 
be divided by purpose (unemployment, pension, sickness, old age care etc), by social category, or 
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both. The lion’s part of social expenditure is financed by contributions from employers and 
employees (typically fifty-fifty). As contributions are mandatory by law, these contributions are 
counted by OECD and others as taxes – de facto contributions are ear-marked, proportional income 
taxes, sometimes with a maximum corresponding with the maximum benefit obtainable. 
 
Universal welfare states impose income taxes rather than social contributions, but sometimes 
supplemented by payroll taxes on employers. Taken together, taxes on labour power (income taxes, 
payroll taxes and social contributions), calculated as proportion of gross wage expenditures, tend to 
be lower in universal welfare states than in the corporatist ones (OECD, 2012a); hence, universal 
welfare states are often pictured as more “employment friendly” (e.g. Scharpf, 2000). In return, 
indirect taxes (e.g. VAT, fees, etc.) are higher in universal welfare states (OECD, 2011a), even 
though border trade set limits. Income taxes are typically low in liberal welfare states; in return, 
they collect the highest property taxes (OECD, 2011a).  
 
 
Eligibility,	entitlements	and	redistribution	
 
As indicated, criteria of social rights are highly different. In corporatist welfare states, the basic 
criterion of eligibility is contributions paid during employment. Entitlements depend on 
contributions – this is the achievement-performance principle. This is sometimes referred to as the 
“Matthew principle” (“For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but 
from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath”). This is fair, however, from 
the principle of reciprocity: Contributions are paid in order to get insurance, and the insurance 
obtained depends on the contributions that are paid. 
 
The basic principle of the residual welfare state could look like the “Robin Hood principle”: Take 
from the rich and give to the poor. The basic (ideological) principle is that people should manage on 
their own. If and only if this is impossible, they are entitled to public support. Need constitutes the 
basic criterion of eligibility and entitlements: Support is targeted at the poor.2 
 
In universal systems the basic criterion is citizenship (which in practice normally means residence). 
All citizens for whom the support is relevant are entitled to receive support. Needless to say, labour 
market participation is a condition of unemployment benefits; disease (as assessed by a 
professional) is a condition of health care. Even need is inevitably a criterion of certain benefits like 
housing benefit (housing policy may also include various forms of general support for a particular 
sector or for particular types of dwellings, but this is not a matter of individual rights).  
 
Universalism is equality-oriented, but not necessarily aimed at maximum equality; rather the goal is 
equal citizenship – enabling everybody to participate in social, political and cultural life as equal 
citizens (despite modest economic inequality). This was the ideal put forward by TH Marshall 
(1949) in his seminal essay “Citizenship and Social Class”. 
 
                                                          
2 There are important variations of targeting. There is a difference between excluding the rich and targeting the poor. 
Targeting the poor often involves stigmatization. This is not the case with excluding the rich. Previously, this was 
sometimes used to picture Australia and New Zealand as a type of their own (Castles & Mitchell, 1991). 
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Crowding	in	or	crowding	out	private	welfare	
If social security is not provided by the public sector, people have to take up private insurances or 
buy private services wherever possible. In other words, there will be a crowding in of private 
markets in insurances and services.3 If public arrangements are sufficiently generous, also for the 
upper middle classes, this will tend to crowd out private solutions.  
 
Table 1. Net social expenditures. Public and Public + Private. 2005. Per cent of GDP. 
 
 
Gross Public 
Expenditure 
Net Public 
Expenditure 
Net social 
expenditure,  
public + private 
Rank 
Net social 
expenditure 
Sweden 34.6 27.3 29.3 5 
France 33.8 30.4 33.6 1 
Denmark 31.9 24.1 25.7 10 
Austria 30.6 24.9 26.5 8 
Germany 29.9 28.1 30.2 3 
Belgium 29.9 26.2 30.3 2 
Finland 29.8 23.5 24.4 11 
Italy 28.8 24.8 26.6 7 
UK 24.3 22.9 29.5 4 
Norway 24.1 19.9 21.2 12 
The Netherlands 23.6 19.3 25.8 9 
USA 17.1 18.4 27.2 6 
OECD-26 23.6 20.8 23.3  
Source: Adema & Ladaique (2009: 48). Per cent of GDP at factor costs. Calculations based on GDP at conventional 
market prices  are slightly problematic methodologically, but provide similar results – with Germany, USA and Austria 
moving one rank up; Belgium, Sweden and Italy one rank down (pp.83-84).  
 
OECD has calculated the net cost of welfare across countries, correcting for different tax rules and 
including private welfare insurances and services (table 1). Net public expenditures corrected for 
taxation reveals that social expenditures are at least as high in continental European welfare states 
as in Scandinavia. This is a stable finding: The universal welfare state is not particularly expensive.  
 
Next, in accordance with functionalist theories emphasizing the association between modernisation 
and welfare, we find much less variation in total expenditures for welfare including private costs. 
Liberal welfare states crowd in private solutions, but the total sum of welfare expenditures in the 
US by 2005 was higher than in Denmark, Finland and Norway. If welfare is not publicly provided, 
it is provided by the market, but with a different social distribution. 
 
Welfare	regime	and	redistribution	
 
In the general public, one may find the perception that targeting benefits as in the residual welfare 
model is the most redistributive. However, any empirical evidence proves the opposite. Maximum 
redistribution is obtained in the universal welfare model, followed by the corporatist whereas the 
residual model is the least redistributive. A Southern European model tends to redistribute as little 
as the liberal model, due to insider/outsider divisions and inadequate social assistance.  
 
                                                          
3 This should not be conflated with outsourcing of welfare to private producers. This is an important trend, but if public 
financing is maintained, outsourcing does not count as an alteration of welfare regime.  
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As indicated by table 2, the conventional wisdom is still confirmed. Economic inequality remains 
much larger in the liberal welfare states and in the Southern European ones (in spite of substantial 
reduction of inequality in Spain 1985-2009). Inequality has grown in Scandinavia, but it remains 
lower than in the Continental European welfare states. 
 
Table 2. Economic Inequality. Gini coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2008; database figure.2). 2009-data from OECD (2011b). Gini coefficients vary between 0,00 
(everybody receives the same) and 1,00 (one person receives all income in society). 
 
There are several explanations for the failure of redistribution in residual welfare states. In the first 
place, redistribution depends on volume. The corporatist and universal model simply redistributes a 
higher share of the social product. Next, there is the question of stigmatisation. If recipients of 
support are mainly to be found among the poor, people are more inclined to believe they are 
“undeserving”, as compared to a situation where taxpayers and recipients are basically the same 
people in different roles (Albrekt Larsen, 2006). Finally, the poor are less able to speak up in public. 
Having people with high resources included among recipients does not only contribute to a feeling 
of community (“being in the same boat”); it also makes it easier to articulate resistance against 
deterioration. Ironically, the poorer recipients are, the larger are the risk of cuts in benefits.  
 
It is important to note that the Gini coefficients do not fully reveal what is happening for the highest 
incomes, and we do not have standard measures of the top income group corresponding with the 
poverty rate (see below). OECD data indicates that inequality has grown more in the Nordic 
countries than in the Continental European ones. Still, according to the Danish Economic Council 
(Det Økonomiske Råd, 2011) the upper 10 per cent in the US had appropriated nearly 95 per cent of 
all improvement in incomes 1980-2010 (see also Hacker & Pierson, 2010). In Denmark, the figure 
was not much above 25 per cent, corresponding roughly with the share of income in 1980. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that Gini coefficients are based on the distribution of disposable 
income. This does not take account of public services (typically provided for free, or at low costs). 
As public services are more comprehensive in the Nordic welfare states, and as services are 
relatively equally distributed, this means that the “true” distribution of consumption possibilities 
tend to be more equal in the Nordic countries than revealed by Gini coefficients. However, another 
C.1975 C.1985 C. 1995 2000 C. 2005 C. 2009 
Denmark .221 .215 .226 .232 .248 
Sweden .212 .198 .211 .243 .234 .259 
Finland .235 .207 .228 .261 .269 .263 
Norway .234 .256 .261 .276 .250 
   Av. Nordic .215 .228 .248 .253 .255 
Netherlands .251 .259 .282 .278 .271 .294 
Belgium .274 .287 .289 .271 .269 
Germany .257 .272 .270 .298 .295 
Austria .236 .238 .252 .265 .265 
France .300 .270 .270 .270 .293 
   Av. Continental .265 .270 .272 .275 .283 
Italy .309 .348 .343 .352 .337 
Spain .371 .343 .342 .319 .309 
   Av. Ita+Spain .340 .346 .343 .336 .323 
U K .282 .325 .354 .370 .335 .341 
USA .316 .338 .361 .357 .381 .378 
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factor pulls even more in the opposite direction: Gini coefficients do not take account of differences 
in commodity taxes which are highly regressive. If, for instance, income tax cuts are financed by 
higher VAT, or by taxes on what is considered “unhealthy” foodstuffs, the Gini coefficient will 
capture the impact of income tax cut. Lower income taxes almost inevitably provide higher Gini 
coefficients. However, Gini coefficients do not reflect the impact of higher living costs because 
commodity taxes are raised. This will inevitably add further to inequality, but this is not measured. 
As commodity taxes are very high in the Nordic countries, this omission exaggerate the “true” level 
of equality in the Nordic countries – in particular in Denmark and Norway. 
 
De‐commodification	
 
In his seminal book Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) Gøsta Esping-Andersen pointed out 
that the key difference between welfare regimes was the degree of de-commodification. In capitalist 
societies, labour power is a commodity, and the key characteristic of social policy is that it serves to 
relieve the social conditions of workers from this fundamental fact – in favour of equal status as 
citizens, to continue in TH Marshall’s (1949) terminology. At best, the residual welfare state 
alleviates poverty but otherwise does not change very much. The corporatist welfare state provides 
social security whilst in principle maintaining status divisions; still, social equality is improved a lot 
as a side effect. Finally, the universal welfare state is oriented towards modifying the status system. 
 
Esping-Andersen linked the formation of welfare regimes to the social classes/political forces 
behind the different models. However, the theory paid less attention to the behaviour of social 
classes within regimes. The working class or the Social Democrats in Western Europe would not 
have much opportunity to break fundamentally with the principles of welfare in the corporatist 
model. Instead, they could seek to modify these principles, in particular the strict association 
between contributions and social rights.  
 
For instance, pensions could be related more to previous wages and less to contributions over the 
full life course. In the language of pension theory this would mean to move from defined 
contribution principles towards defined benefit pensions. Next, certain social rights could be 
extended beyond the employed, to groups outside the labour market, and to students. Minimum 
pensions could be introduced, in order to relieve people without a contribution record from 
dependence on social assistance in old age. Over the decades, a large number of such modifications 
were introduced in corporatist systems, not least in Germany. In the Netherlands, pensions even 
became a hybrid since they were financed by pension contributions (as a percentage of wages) 
whereas the corresponding benefit became a flat-rate pension like in an ideal-typical universal 
welfare state (Anderson, 2004). 
 
As pointed out below, while the dominant trend of reform until around 1990 moved towards de-
commodification, the trend in most significant reforms since then was reversed, even in universalist 
regimes, i.e. heading towards re-commodification. 
 
De‐familialisation	
Another trend that has pulled in the same direction across welfare regimes is de-familialisation. 
Family structures have changed from single-earner families towards dual-earner families. The 
family dimension was fitted into a revised version of Esping-Andersen’s theory (Esping-Andersen, 
1999). Until then, corporatist welfare states had supported the traditional division of labour within 
12 
 
the family, that is, single-earner families. One precondition was generous security in case of 
unemployment, sickness, disability etc. Another was tax rules giving advantages to families having 
their income concentrated on one person. By contrast, the Scandinavian countries had changed their 
tax systems towards treating the individual as the basic unit. This provided stronger work incentives 
for married women. The other main effort was provision of public child care and elderly care on a 
massive scale. This enabled more women to work and at the same time generated a huge number of 
new jobs in the public service sector. 
 
This process was deliberately delayed in the Continental European welfare states. But pressure from 
well-educated women wanting a working life, and from demographic forecasts predicting a 
declining labour force, pushed towards modernisation. In addition, low fertility rates constitute a 
silent protest against unsatisfying child care facilities. Low fertility, in turn, aggravates the long-
term challenge of ageing populations (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002).  
 
When married women in the Nordic countries entered the labour force, there was an irresistible 
demand for public child care. When similar demands appeared in Continental Europe a couple of 
decades later, the “golden age” of expansion was over. Gradually, most countries have moved in the 
same direction, but more slowly and reluctantly. Political leaders in liberal/residual welfare states 
have welcomed women’s work but have not been very inclined to provide state financed child care 
facilities. This has left many families to solve the task themselves, e.g. by hiring domestic workers. 
 
Even though reforms have moved in Scandinavian direction, this is an instance of parallel trends 
rather than convergence (Kautto & Kvist, 2001). De-familialisation remains a standard dimension 
for distinguishing between welfare regimes, with universalist welfare states promoting and 
supporting double-earning families. Residual welfare states have been less supportive, and 
corporative welfare states have moved from resisting change towards neutrality or active support. 
Still, the social care sector typically remains smaller than in the Nordic countries. 
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3.	Regime	approach	–	insurance	approach	–	welfare	mix	approach	
 
Welfare models can de described in different languages. The welfare regime approach remains the 
most widespread in social policy theory, but many economists prefer the language of insurance and 
risk management. As regards income transfers, these concepts make perfectly sense even though 
some concepts are stretched a little as compared to everyday usage. For instance, pensions are 
covering the risk of getting old. When it comes to services, conventional language must be extended 
even further to describe child care as risk coverage, but this is a matter of conventions. 
 
Insurance	approach	
 
If the welfare state is analysed as an enormous insurance arrangement (figure 3.), welfare regimes 
may be distinguished on the basis of risk coverage and risk sharing/risk pooling. This is spelled out 
in Esping-Andersen (1999). Universal welfare states are described as providing widespread risk 
pooling (typically the entire population) for a broad range of risks. Coverage is a bit narrower in 
corporatist welfare states (family care less developed) 4; risk sharing is divided by status, and those 
who are outside the labour market tend to suffer from insufficient social protection. The residual 
welfare state ideal-typically provides support for a limited scope of social risks. 
 
Figure 3. Welfare Regimes as Models of Social Insurance. 
 Risk Coverage/Scope 
Broad Narrow 
Risk pooling High Universal/Social Dem. X 
Low Corporatist/Conservative Residual/Liberal 
 
The insurance perspective also facilitates discussions about public vs. private insurance. 
Competition usually forces private insurance companies to divide those insured into different risk 
categories with different premiums. As social risks are highest among the poor, they would be left 
with the highest payment. Moreover, some risks are almost impossible to insure (Barr, 2001). 
Unemployment insurance is particularly difficult. As risks are unequally distributed, competition 
would bring premiums that were impossible to pay for high-risk groups, and not worth paying 
anyway for those with low risks. This is one reason why unemployment insurance is mandatory in 
nearly all advanced welfare states. The state wants people to be insured because it is a welfare gain, 
but also because a safety net makes workers more mobile, flexible and willing to take risks 
(Andersen et al., 2007; Andersen, 2012). In short, there is a collective advantage of insurance. 
 
Insurance terms also make it possible to define solidarity in terms of risk pooling. Solidarity is 
tantamount to pooling the “good” risks with the “bad” risks. When it comes to old-age pensions, for 
instance, “good” risk means a short life whereas “bad” risk means a long life. This has a significant 
gender aspect: If women are unable to pool their “bad” risks with the “good” risks of men, they are 
left with lower annual pensions even if they have the same earnings and contributions. As regards 
unemployment, the important question is whether low-educated individuals are punished for their 
higher risk of unemployment or are allowed to share risks with those having a better risk profile.  
                                                          
4 Child care is expanding, as well as elderly care. It should be noticed that there have been kindergartens for decades in 
most Continental European welfare states, often run by the church, but with opening hours not being accommodated to 
normal working hours. Child care was traditionally a supplement for children who were taken care of at home. 
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Welfare	mix	approach	
 
Whereas the insurance approach is particularly relevant for transfers (cash benefits), the welfare 
mix approach is applied mostly for services. It should be underlined, though, that a welfare mix 
approach is inescapable for pensions where “multipillar pension systems” are composed of state, 
employment-related and purely individual private pensions.  
 
Even though “the mixed economy of welfare” is a relatively new term (Powell, 2007), it is basically 
a classical perspective which was also embodied in Esping-Andersen’s (1999) regime theory.5 The 
approach is seeing welfare as being “produced” by some combination of the state, the market, and 
the family – the “welfare triangle”. Sometimes voluntary associations are added as a fourth welfare 
producer – making the triangle into a “welfare diamond” (figure 4) 
 
Figure 4. The welfare triangle and the welfare diamond. 
 
   
 
 
As pointed out by Esping-Andersen (1999) and even more concisely by Kuhnle & Alestalo (2000), 
the universal welfare model puts extraordinary weight on the state; the residual welfare state 
emphasises the market; and the corporatist welfare state divide responsibilities between the state 
and the family. Kuhnle & Alestalo (2000) also identifies the Southern European Welfare State as a 
sui generis, distinguished from the corporatist model by its extraordinary emphasis on the family. 
Others (Ferrera, 1996) have added the universal health care system and an under-developed social 
assistance as important traits; missing the lowest safety net Southern Europeans become 
extraordinarily dependent on the family – and on undeclared (“black”) labour. 
 
Titmuss (1974) distinguished between social welfare, occupational welfare and fiscal welfare. 
Occupational welfare includes arrangements at the labour market, provided by the employers or 
through collective negotiations, e.g. pensions (in some countries also health insurance). Fiscal 
welfare includes tax subsidies for private welfare arrangements. In Denmark, health insurance 
provided by firms was tax-deductible for some years until 2012, that is, it represented a de facto 
expenditure for the state. It was debated whether it saved more money than the costs for the state. 
 
The welfare triangle and the welfare diamond are insufficient to describe the current welfare mix of 
e.g. Nordic welfare states. One would also have to take account of: 
 The social partners (trade unions and employers’ associations) 
 Social responsibility of firms (overlapping with so-called “corporate social responsibility”) 
 Combinations including state subsidy to other welfare producers, e.g.: 
                                                          
5 Johnson (1987) and others have referred to similar trends under the headline ”welfare pluralism”. 
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- Family (e.g. cash for care) 
- Companies (e.g. subsidised employment) 
- Voluntary associations (subsidies) 
- The Market (tax subsidies or fiscal welfare) 
 
 
Figure 5. An expanded welfare triangle/”governance model” of social welfare. 
 
Moreover, the dichotomy between state and market should be replaced by eight possible 
combinations of financing, deciding and delivering welfare. Outsourcing combines private delivery 
with public responsibility for financing and decisions; user charges reduces public responsibility on 
the financing dimension; commercial services enables public providers to deliver supplementary 
services on market conditions; there is a name for each of the eight possible combinations. 
 
Rather than seeing any intrusion of markets, firms, voluntary associations as re-commodification or 
welfare erosion, we need a broader perspective. From a social policy perspective, two aspects are 
crucial: First, the financing dimension because of its obvious implications for poverty and equality. 
And secondly, the state’s responsibility for outcomes.6 The key dimension regarding possible state 
vs. market combinations is financing, and several combinations of responsibilities may – in 
principle, at least – constitute functional equivalents to state welfare, provided that the state remains 
responsible for the outcome of the entire fabric (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2008).  
 
 
 
 	
                                                          
6 One version of Gilbert & Gilbert’s (1997) concept of  ”enabling state” to assign such a coordinating role to the state. 
16 
 
4.	Impact	on	welfare:	Combating	poverty,	happiness,	social	cohesion	
 
Redistribution	and	poverty	
From welfare regime theory, we expect the universal welfare model to be most redistributive and 
adapted to mitigate poverty, followed by the corporatist model. Residual welfare states should 
redistribute the least. This was broadly confirmed by gini coefficients (c.f. table 2 above), and 
poverty rates basically reveal the same pattern (table 3). Poverty is conventionally defined as having 
less than 50 per cent of the median equivalised disposable income – disposable income denoting 
income after tax whereas “equivalised” means corrected for household composition and size7. The 
EU typically applies a poverty line of 60 per cent, reflecting higher equality ambitions.  
 
Following the 50 per cent threshold, there are, according to OECD (Table 3), on average 7.3 per 
cent poor in the five Nordic countries, 8.2 per cent in six Continental European countries, 11.2 per 
cent in five Southern European countries (Corporatist model, southern version), and 13.2 per cent 
on average in five Anglo Saxon countries approaching the residual welfare model.  
 
Table 3. Poverty before and after taxes and transfers, and poverty reduction. Late 2000s. 
Percentages.  
 
Source: www.oecd.org (read 2012-08-31; own calculations of poverty reduction). 
                                                          
7 There is not one single method of calculation. The most simple method is to divide the household income by the 
square root of the number of people in the household. 
Poverty threshold 50 % 
Poverty before 
tax & transfers 
Poverty after 
tax & transfers 
Poverty Reduction: 
% pre-tax poor lifted 
Denmark 22,1 6,1 72 
Sweden 26,5 8,4 68 
Finland 30,1 8,0 73 
Norway 23,8 7,8 67 
Iceland 19,0 6,4 66 
     Average 5 Nordic 24,3 7,3 70 
Germany 32,5 8,9 73 
Netherlands 24,1 7,2 70 
Belgium 31,4 9,4 70 
Luxembourg 26,9 8,5 68 
Austria 28,8 7,9 72 
France 32,6 7,2 78 
     Average 6 Continental 29,4 8,2 72 
Italy 33,3 11,4 66 
Spain 27,2 14,0 48 
Portugal 28,4 12,0 58 
Greece 31,1 10,8 65 
Slovenia 25,3 8,0 68 
     Average 5 Southern 29,1 11,2 61 
United Kingdom 31,2 11,0 65 
United States 27,0 17,3 36 
Australia 27,2 14,6 46 
Canada 24,7 12,0 51 
New Zealand 22,4 11,0 51 
     Average 5 Anglo Saxon 26,5 13,2 50 
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Table 3 also shows how poverty is reduced by the welfare state since it includes the proportion of 
poor before taxes and income transfers. Pre-tax poverty is lowest in Scandinavia (24.3 per cent). As 
post-tax poverty is only 7.3 per cent, this means that 70 per cent are lifted out of poverty. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the proportion lifted out of poverty is at least as high in the Continental European 
welfare states. On average, Southern welfare states are less efficient in combating poverty (61 per 
cent lifted out of poverty). As expected, the Anglo Saxon welfare states are the least efficient. Pre-
tax poverty is not extreme, but only one-half is lifted out of poverty. There is a great difference, 
though, between UK (65 per cent) and USA (36 per cent). 
 
This ranking is relatively stable over time even though inequality and poverty has been increasing 
in all welfare regimes since the 1980s (OECD, 2008, 2011): Inequality and poverty remains lowest 
in Scandinavia, but Northern European corporatist welfare seem equally efficient in alleviating 
inequality and poverty. Southern European are less efficient, and Anglo Saxon welfare states 
contribute the least to inequality and poverty reduction. This would seem to confirm that the “Robin 
Hood” principle is not efficient.  
 
Well‐Being	and	Happiness		
In the final analysis, the purpose of the welfare state is to improve the quality of life of its citizens. 
The Scandinavian countries have a long tradition of “living conditions suveys” including a wide 
array of aspects, mainly objective ones. Recently, OECD and others have put much effort into 
developing measures of the “Good Life”,8 combining objective and subjective measures. Regarding 
subjective measures, there are several possible indicators of well-being at the individual level; 
happiness or “overall life satisfaction” are the most widely used.  
 
Needless to say, there are many determinants of happiness (Gilbert, 2007; Diener et al., 2010). At 
least until a level, higher GDP is among the most important ones, and at the individual level, it is 
social relations – alongside factors like employment/unemployment. But at least in Scandinavia, 
economic hardship is the most crucial aspect determining happiness among the unemployed (Goul 
Andersen, 2002; Ervasti, 2004; Gallie & Paugam, 2000).  
 
Even though there is any reason to expect that welfare regime, inequality and poverty would impact 
on happiness and life satisfaction (Greve, 2010) – and even though bivariate associations between 
equality and welfare abound (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) – this remains a contested issue (Berg & 
Veenhoven, 2010) which cannot be discussed thoroughly here. Still, without drawing too hasty 
conclusions about causality we may observe that international survey findings conform to this 
assumption very nicely. Figure 6 pictures the findings of the 2010 European Social Survey where 
overall life satisfaction is measured on a scale from 0 to 10. At the highest rankings we find the four 
Scandinavian countries alongside the Netherlands and Belgium which are the corporatist welfare 
states coming most close to the Scandinavian ones. 
 
Social	Capital	
Another key argument regarding the welfare state is its presumed impact on social cohesion. 
Among several possible indicators we only include one: Social capital which is conventionally 
defined as norms of reciprocity and ability to cooperate. The normative side is usually considered 
the most important since it determines the behavioural side. The standard indicator of norms of 
                                                          
8 For OECD’s Better Life Initiative, see http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/about/better-life-initiative/ 
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reciprocity is social trust, that is, trust in people you do not know. Can most people be trusted, or do 
you have to be very careful when dealing with people – to paraphrase the standard question from 
the World Values Surveys. 
 
Figure 6. Overall Life Satisfaction. Average on scale 0-10. 2010.  
 
Question: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? Please answer using this 
card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied”. 
Source: ESS 2010 (own computations). 
 
 
Declining social trust has been a source of concern in the Anglo Saxon countries, in particular the 
US (Putnam, 2000). In Continental Europe, however, no decline is indicated, and in Scandinavia 
social trust has rather increased. In social capital theory, social trust used to be linked to 
participation in voluntary associations. At the macro level there actually does seem to be a link; at 
the individual level, however, the association is weak. But it has also been demonstrated that 
universalist welfare institutions contribute to social trust (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005), and others 
have argued that welfare generosity and mitigation of poverty is essential (Albrekt Larsen, 2007). 
Again, we are constrained to demonstrate that the Scandinavian welfare states are in an 
(increasingly) unique situation as regards social trust (see figure 7).9 
 
  
                                                          
9 Sometimes former Communist countries are left out since low social trust in these countries has a ”disturbing” impact. 
With the opposite sign, this also holds for Southern America as regards happiness. 
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Figure 7. Social Trust. Percentages believing that most people can be trusted. 2005-2008. 
 
Question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people? 1 Most people can be trusted. 2 Need to be very careful. 
Source: Calculated from 2005-08 wave of World Values Survey. (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org) Danish data from 
2010 survey of Immigration and Citizenship conducted by Epinion for the Ministry of Integration in cooperation with 
the author. 
 
Like in the case of life satisfaction/happiness, there are variations over time, but the high prevalence 
of social trust in the Nordic countries is a stable finding, and the trend seems to be upwards rather 
than downwards, in spite of predictions about the impact of increasing ethnic heterogeneity etc. 
 
Welfare	and	the	Welfare	State	
The data above are insufficient to prove that welfare regime and welfare generosity determines the 
well-being of the population. Rigorous testing could bring us further, but we leave it here with the 
suggestion that welfare states seem to do their work: Alleviating poverty and insecurity, integrating 
people as citizens and enhancing citizens’ welfare. It is not implied that all blessings are attributable 
to the welfare state. But most scholars would probably agree that the welfare state is co-responsible. 
Most decision makers – and public opinion – would also agree on the positive impact. The critical 
question – in the Nordic countries as elsewhere – is not whether the welfare state is desirable but 
whether it is sustainable. Targets of efficiency and sustainability have also overshadowed welfare 
within international associations like the OECD – until the significant growth in concern for the 
good life and for combating poverty and inequality within the last 5-10 years.  
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5.	Demographic	challenges	and	patterns	of	reform	
 
Social	challenges	
Welfare states have always changed in response to changes in society at large (and vice versa), but 
phrasing this as “challenges” is relatively new. Taken literally, “challenges” could refer to new 
social risks, increasing inequality or new social needs, but in political and public discourse 
“challenges” typically denote economic challenges. It should be underlined, though, that social 
challenges are equally important. 
 
Social problems are accumulating in many countries. As described above, the long-term trend 
towards equality and elimination of poverty was reversed from the 1980s. Increasing social 
inequality in health and longevity is another challenge (Brønnum-Hansen, 2006; Brønnum-Hansen 
& Baadsgaard, 2008) which moreover interacts with higher pension age brackets; for a considerable 
minority one can foresee long working age, bad health, and short retirement due to high mortality. 
 
Most European welfare states also face increasing insider/outsider division on the labour market – 
referred to as dualization (Emmenegger et al., 2012) – with a corresponding growth in “precarious” 
jobs and of working poor – a concept previously referring to (and officially recognized in) the US 
(Fraser et al., 2011). Inspired by the US, European reforms aimed at alleviating the conditions of the 
working poor now include tax credits for the employed. Ironically, tax credits have also entered tax 
reforms in Denmark (2003 and 2012), even though the Scandinavian welfare states have so far 
experienced a decline in precarious employment (Dølvik et al., 2012). 
 
One social issue is often referred to as a “challenge”: Insufficient child care. The traditional family 
structure has eroded everywhere. Unstoppable by conservative policies aimed at maintaining the 
male breadwinner model, married women massively entered the labour market, much as they did in 
Scandinavia some decades ago. Child care facilities are typically inadequate (Esping-Andersen et 
al., 2002). Alternatives include domestic workers (often from abroad) and informal care by family 
members or older school children. Welfare states face two economic challenges: First, continuing 
pressure for improved public child care; secondly, low fertility rates that contribute to aggravate the 
challenge of demographic ageing. While the Nordic countries have solved these problems, most 
welfare states muddle through with some improvements in a context of long-term austerity. 
 
Economic	Challenges:	Demographic	ageing	
Two good news are underlying the challenge of ageing populations. First, longevity has increased 
more than anybody could hope for. Second, declining fertility worldwide has alleviated the danger 
of overpopulation. In advanced industrial societies, however, the combination of these two trends 
constitutes an economic challenge. All countries face a significant increase in old age dependency 
ratios. This is normally measured as the number of elderly people (65 years or more), relative to the 
working age population (the 15-64 years old).  
 
Even though child dependency ratios decline in tandem with increasing old age dependency, there 
will be, ceteris paribus, a substantial increase in expenditures for pensions, health care, elderly care 
etc. – and a smaller working age population to contribute. To maintain economic sustainability, 
governments have followed two paths. The first is to “prevent ceteris paribus” – making sure that 
other things are not equal. If the working age population shrinks, the task is to extract more work 
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from those that remain – in short, to increase labour supply. The other path is pension reforms that 
seek to extend working life and to relieve the government from expenditures. 
Activation	of	social	protection/social	investment	welfare	state	
There are several over-arching labels for the attempt to extract more labour power. Barbier (2002) 
proposed the concept Activation of social protection, referring not only to activation, but to policies 
targeting all potentially employed, as well to tax policies aimed at improving labour supply. This 
may also involve social policies becoming subordinated to or integrated into labour market policy 
(Clasen & Clegg, 2011). Others have spoken of a transition to a Social investment welfare state (e.g. 
Morel, Palier & Palme, 2012). This concept is very much overlapping, but does not cover tax 
policy. Besides, it is somewhat more normative, but coupled to a Social Democratic vision and 
emphasizing investment in human resources, in particular for the young.10 
 
At any rate, efforts to increase labour supply have included both carrots & sticks – and sometimes a 
helping hand. Activation, narrowly defined, has tended to move from a helping hand towards 
carrots and sticks – from a human resource approach towards a work first approach (Goul Andersen 
& Pedersen, 2007; Larsen, 2009; Eichhorst et al., 2008; Clegg, 2008; Clasen & Clegg, 2011; Betzelt 
& Bothfeld, 2011; Goul Andersen, 2012). Broadly conceived, instruments to activate include e.g.: 
 Tax incentives to work longer hours, working overtime, having side jobs, etc. 
 More conditionality (job search requirements etc.) for those unemployed  
 Less generous security for those unemployed (shorter duration, lower benefits) 
 Efforts to increase employment among immigrants 
 Efforts to increase employment among the least employable: Long-term unemployed, 
people with health problems, disabled, and others (carrots and sticks, contacts with 
employers, upgrading qualifications, rehabilitation) 
 Higher age brackets in retirement systems 
 
The mix between these elements is subject to variation over time and between countries. “Social 
investment” denotes less emphasis on carrots and sticks, less on taxes, and more on human 
resources (education, upgrading qualifications). This is often combined with the other main 
strategy: Pension/retirement reforms. 
 
Pension	reforms		
When Bismarck introduced old age insurance in 1889 for people aged more than 70, this affected a 
tiny minority.11 A quarter of a century later the age bracket was changed to 65 years, and as fertility 
declined and longevity improved, costs slowly increased. Still, the rise in life expectancy for 60 
years old did not really take off until the 1980s, and the very low fertility rates in many countries 
were reached in the 1970s. This puts pensions under pressure. 
 
So-called pay as you go pension systems are vulnerable. They are based on the principle that the 
currently employed population pay pension contributions or taxes to support those currently retired. 
As pensions in corporatist welfare states are largely unfunded – contributions finance current 
                                                          
10 Social investment in education and upgrading of qualifications has always been a core element in the Nordic welfare 
model. Still, in the new version social investment (not least for the middle class) is sometimes prioritized at the 
expense of social protection (mainly for the working class). It might be claimed that a class struggle is taking 
place within the welfare state, rather than about the welfare state. 
11 The pension scheme also included disability pension, however. 
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expenditures – these welfare states face a problem with the “generation contract”: Having paid high 
contributions, people expect generous pensions in return; with a shrinking working age population 
this becomes difficult to finance. Pension contributions become excessively high. The state may 
relieve the burden by tax-financed subsidies (as in Germany), but after all, most of these taxes are 
also imposed on the working age population. 
 
In the wake of the 1994 World Bank Report Averting the Old Age Crisis, most welfare states have 
taken efforts to reform the pension systems (e.g. Anderson et al., 2007; Bonoli & Palier, 2008; 
Kangas et al., 2010; Palier, 2010; Ebbinghaus, 2011). These reforms have several elements in 
common, all of which may be summarized under two headlines: “recommodification”, and relief of 
the state from pension obligations: 
 Doing away with formal or informal early retirement 
 Higher pension age 
 Longer contributions required for full pension entitlements (in defined benefit systems) 
 Change of basic principles from defined benefit (politically determined entitlements, as a 
fixed sum, or as a proportion of wage during best years) to defined contribution (pensions 
strictly determined by contributions and returns on investments)12. 
 More funded pensions instead of pay as you go 
 Movement towards multipillar pension systems combining a pillar of state pensions, a pillar 
of occupational pensions, and a pillar of purely individual pensions. This automatically 
involves increasing weight on the defined contribution principle and typically involves more 
emphasis on funded schemes 
 
Gone are the days when welfare states were conceived as “frozen landscapes” (Goul Andersen, 
2007a). All welfare states have changed in reaction to the challenge of ageing, sometimes by path-
breaking reforms, sometimes by series of incremental changes that in the long run changed the path 
(Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). The Scandinavian countries were proactive in 
starting pension reforms already in the mid-1980s. Even though pension reforms have moved in the 
same direction, this is also an instance of parallel trends rather than convergence. Moreover, there 
are huge differences between welfare states as regards demographic challenges. 
 
State	and	regime	differences	in	demography	
Welfare regimes and individual welfare states differ very significantly as regards demographic 
change. Due to large differences in fertility rates – and in net migration – countries face highly 
different futures of ageing (Table 4 and Figure 8). In Scandinavia, fertility has remained close to 2.0 
(slightly less than required for reproduction). In most corporatist welfare states fertility is low, but 
France is an exception, and the Benelux countries have approached the high fertility group. This 
holds also for most Anglo Saxon countries. In the German-speaking countries and in Southern 
Europe, however, fertility has been low for decades. This is also the case for Eastern Asian welfare 
states which are often pictured as being most similar to the corporatist welfare model. Demography 
also looks troublesome for Eastern European welfare states; fertility is uniformly low. Southern 
Europe and Eastern Asia are among the regions with the highest life expectancy whereas Eastern 
Europe is lagging behind. 
 
                                                          
12 Strictly speaking, defined contribution refers to funded systems. ”Notional” defined contribution denotes systems that 
may be without any savings (“pay as you go”), but calculates pension entitlements according to contributions.  
23 
 
Table 4. Fertility and Life Expectancy, 2010. 
  Life Expectancy at birth 
 Fertility Men Women 
Iceland  2.20 79.5 83.5 
Norway  1.95 79.0 83.3 
Denmark  1.88 77.2 81.4 
Sweden  1.98 79.5 83.5 
Finland 1.87 76.9 83.5 
France 1.99 78.0 84.7 
UK  1.98 78.6 82.6 
Netherlands  1.80 78.8 82.7 
Belgium  1.87 77.6 83.0 
Germany  1.39 78.0 83.0 
Austria  1.44 77.9 83.5 
Switzerland  1.54 80.3 84.9 
Italy  1.41 79.3 84.7 
Spain  1.38 79.1 85.3 
Poland  1.38 72.1 80.6 
Japan  1.39 79.6 86.4 
USA  1.93 76.2 81.1 
Russia (Rosstat)  1.54 62.8 74.7 
Source: Eurostat; national statistics for non EU-countries. 
 
The impact of such demographic parameters on population prospects is considerable (Figure 8). At 
one extreme we find Japan where the projected old age dependency ratio is expected to increase to 
75 per cent. In Eastern and Southern Europe, the corresponding figure is close to 60 per cent 
whereas it is only around 40 per cent in the Nordic region and in a few other countries. This is about 
the same old age dependency rate as in Japan today (2013 or 2014). 
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Figure 8. Old-age dependency ratios (projections) in 2050. People aged 65 years or more as 
percentage of 15-64 years old.
 
 
Source: Eurostat and Japanese Statistical Yearbook. 
 
The Japanese situation is critical since its population is estimated to decline by about two-thirds 
within the next 100 years. This is one of the biggest natural experiments in human history. At that 
time, the small Japanese population will be extremely old. Population decline means a massive 
downscaling, and it means that the country will probably enter a permanent negative growth 
situation since population decline exceeds productivity growth. 
 
The same drama is to take place in much of Europe, albeit in slow motion. The EU is also on the 
verge of population decline, but until the 2020s, this can be offset by immigration. It seems that 
immigration is an option that Japan has not considered seriously. By contrast, in the United States 
the population continues to grow due to migration and high fertility rates (around the Nordic level).  
 
 
Regime	differences	in	pensions	
As regards pensions, all Nordic countries are in a favourable situation. Pension systems are 
reformed, and demographic projections are good due to high fertility. The main threat is a decline in 
fertility. It is debated whether economic incentives in terms of child cash benefits may affect 
fertility. Some countries have designed their child benefit/tax systems to improve incentives by 
having larger support for the 3rd and successive children. Denmark went in the opposite direction in 
2010 by limiting child benefits to two, sometimes three children. This may contribute to explain an 
unexpected decline in fertility from 1.874 in 2010 to 1.756 in 2011. Although the 2010 rules were 
repealed by the incoming government by the end of 2011, continued uncertainty contributes to low 
fertility throughout 2012. Over a few years, this could affect demographic prospects.  
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However, in the case of Denmark, an increasing share of pensioners will pay more in income taxes 
than they withdraw in pensions. The backbone of the pension system is changed towards fully 
funded labour market pensions, typically agreed upon by the social partners, with contribution rates 
from 12 per cent and upwards. In addition, there is a small supplementary state scheme (ATP) 
which is also fully funded. At the same time, the state system has become more of a residual 
system. Taken together, these pillars are expected to provide roughly the same outcomes as state 
financed contributory functions with guaranteed minima in Sweden and Norway. However, in 
Denmark public pension expenditures have since 1980 been declining relative to GDP (Goul 
Andersen, 2002; Det Økonomiske Råd, 2005), and in the future, large numbers of pensioners will 
pay more in income taxes than they receive in public pensions (Goul Andersen, 2012).13 
 
 
 	
                                                          
13 More specifically, this required in 2012 an income of 181.000 DKK (excluding public pensions) – about the 
equivalent of the labour market pension of a school teacher or a nurse. In addition to income tax, pensioners of course 
also pay VAT, all sorts of fees, property taxes etc. 
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6.	Globalization	as	an	economic	challenge	to	welfare? 
 
The discussion about globalisation as a challenge to the welfare state was initially linked to a new 
discourse about globalisation launched around 1990. This was also the time when the term 
“Globalization” was coined as an alternative to the previous term “Internationalisation”. Moreover, 
internationalisation was traditionally assumed to be positively related to the welfare state.  
 
Classic	theories	of	small	open	economies	
The most cited theories from the 1970s and 1980s – Katzenstein’s (1985) book about “small states 
in world markets”, and Cameron’s (1978) analysis of the sources of public expenditure growth, had 
emphasised the need for large welfare states in small countries exposed to international competition. 
Small “open” economies (high exports and imports, relative to GDP) are highly exposed to business 
cycle fluctuations. This requires a high capacity of flexible adaptation and coordination of the 
economy in some sort of corporatist arrangements, it was argued, and a big welfare state serves to 
smooth this cooperation while at the same time stabilizing the economy. Hence, small states benefit 
from a large welfare state. 
 
What’s	new	about	globalisation?	
The new consensus that emerged in the 1990s was different. Mainstream economics had left 
Keynesianism and the belief in state corrections of market failures in favour of a strong belief in the 
market. Focus changed from market failures that required political solutions, to state failures that 
required market solutions. Concern with the supply side replaced concern with the demand side. 
 
Arguably, there is a difference between internationalisation and globalisation. Internationalisation 
referred to any cross-national interaction. Globalisation, if taken literally, refers to interaction and 
dependence between continents. Critiques have argued that cross-continental trade remain modest. 
However, this argument ignores the issue of dependency. Previously, manufacturers could have a 
“home market” from which they might eventually expand to the world market. Currently, there is 
not much of a home market for products and services that can be traded. Except for sheltered 
branches, global competitiveness is imperative. 
 
Economic globalisation usually includes three dimensions: 
 Trade. Exports and Imports increase at a much higher speed than the GDP.14 
 Foreign direct investments. The largest companies have become completely transnational 
and invest wherever it is most profitable. 
 International capital movements. After deregulation in the 1980s, capital flows exploded 
 
Rather than globalisation, one should perhaps speak of “globalisation regimes”, distinguished by 
different rules of the games, set by different dominant actors. The period from the 1870s to 1913 
was one such regime; the institutions set up in Bretton Woods in 1944 (lasting until 1971) was 
another; the extreme liberalisation 1980-2008 was a third. The crucial explanation of the 
globalisation regime and discourse from the 1980s onwards is political. The Reagan administration 
in the US, supported by Thatcher in the UK, successfully launched an international release of the 
                                                          
14 It should be added that this is by no means a linear process. During the two World Wars, and during the 1930s, the 
trend was reversed. By 2010, some countries had not caught up the level of openness in the economy they had in 1913. 
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market forces, not least globalisation of financial markets. The accompanying market-oriented 
discourse became known as the “Washington consensus”.  
 
The global liberalization of financial markets nearly destroyed itself by the financial crisis of 2008. 
What follows after the great recession remains to be seen. Inevitably, the rules of the future will be 
co-determined by new players, in particular the “emerging economies” (a term that may become 
outdated as these economies mature and surpass the traditional economic giants). 
 
In short, globalisation was never a linear process; it is politically determined; it is not necessarily 
linked to ever less regulated markets; and in the future, it seems to become less of an interaction 
between “poor” and “rich” countries, more of an interaction between countries at an increasingly 
similar economic level. Still, globalisation remains intrinsically linked to competitiveness.  
 
Welfare	states	under	pressure?	Equality,	taxation,	autonomy	in	economic	policy	
Framing the question of globalisation in this language makes it possible to skip useless discussions 
about globalisation as a threat to the welfare state as such. That kind of debates followed the 
globalisation discourse of the 1990s, but currently there is agreement that it must be specified what 
may come under pressure. More recent discussions have focussed on three issues: Equality, taxation 
and autonomy in economic policy. 
 
To begin with economic policy, there are constraints to the Keynesian steering optimism of the 
“golden era” of the welfare state from 1945 to 1970, aimed at full employment. Still, this does not 
mean complete loss of autonomy. Some instruments have disappeared, others have appeared. 
Maybe full employment has become more difficult to attain, but this does not necessarily constitute 
at threat to the welfare state. 
 
There is a stronger logic behind the argument that globalisation entails a pressure against equality. 
The seminal OECD Jobs Study (1994) highlighted the trade-off between equality and employment: 
High minimum wages would make it impossible for employers to earn a profit on the labour power 
of the least skilled workers. Hence, minimum wages should be reduced. It was also argued that 
equality would sacrifice even more if people remained long-term unemployed, and new ideas of tax 
credits were disseminated as a means of alleviating the impact in equality. 
 
However, European countries refrained from reducing minimum wages. OECD (1997) gave in and 
recommended activation/qualification as second-best solution. This idea was radicalised at the 2000 
Lisbon summit where the EU committed itself to develop "the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion" before 2010. Leaving aside pompous language, it remains 
that improving qualifications among the least skilled, and avoiding poverty and social 
marginalisation, may contribute to mitigate the equality-employment trade off. 
 
Empirical data have consistently shown that unemployment among the least skilled is lower in 
Scandinavian welfare states than elsewhere; employment rates are higher; and the ratio between 
unemployment at the lowest and the highest skill levels is smallest in Scandinavia where wage 
equality is most pronounced (Goul Andersen, 2007b). This would seem to contradict theories of 
liberalisation, but it is actually in accordance with the classical Rehn-Meidner economic doctrine of 
the Swedish labour movement (Erixon, 2011; see also Barth & Moene, 2009). 
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Globalization does constitute a challenge to equality as internationalisation always did. But there 
are other means than reducing minimum wages to match the qualification of the least skilled. 
Traditionally, the Scandinavian strategy has been the opposite: To improve qualifications of the 
least skilled to match the high minimum wages. It should be borne in mind that this remains a great 
challenge. But it does not leave the welfare state as a victim of the challenge of globalisation; it 
leaves it as a solution to this challenge. 
 
The third argument about taxes has also been refined since it was projected in the 1990s that 
globalisation would force nation states into a race to the bottom in their competition to reduce 
taxes. Accordingly, there would be too little money for welfare. However, it is misleading to 
assume that taxes necessarily constitute a problem in relation to competitiveness. It must be 
specified how and why this is the case. 
 
The crucial factor is mobility. Capital is highly mobile and is attracted by lower corporate taxes. 
However, taxes only constitute one incentive; being close to markets, qualified labour power, 
infrastructure etc. are only a few items on a long list. In fact, corporate tax rates have been 
significantly reduced, but mainly by widening the tax base, i.e. by removing favourable tax 
deductions etc. Corporate taxes as per cent of GDP have typically not declined, but most countries 
have abolished wealth taxes. 
 
As regards taxes on commodities, the constraint is border trade. In the EU, this constraint has 
become tighter in tandem with abolition of customs control. However, there are also differences in 
commodity taxes between states in the US. As regards the Nordic countries, Sweden has been 
compelled to adjust some taxes to the Danish level, and Denmark to the German level. Still, 
commodity taxes have constituted a largely constant part of total revenues. Since commodity taxes 
are regressive taxes, however, it should be noticed that downward adjustments of commodity taxes 
pull towards a more equal distribution in the Nordic countries.  
 
Since the 1990s, a main concern has been taxes on labour power. As labour power is conventionally 
seen as immobile, the traditional view was globalisation did not dictate any constraints in this field. 
However, for highly qualified workers with few language barriers, this might change. Hence, there 
has been more focus on taxes for this group. 
 
It is important to note that it is marginal taxes that counts when the question is about incentives to 
increase labour supply. When it comes to globalisation, on the other hand, it is average taxes. This 
does not only include taxes on labour power but also indirect taxes. At least in Denmark, many 
political decision makers have not been conscious of this distinction, indicating that real motives are 
about distribution rather than concern for globalisation or labour supply.  
 
Whatever the “true” motives, it remains that both average and marginal taxes on labour are modest 
in the Nordic welfare states. In 2011, according to OECD’s annual Taxing Wages publication 
(OECD, 2012a), marginal tax for a single, average worker in Denmark was the same as in the US, 
and for all household types except one Danish average and marginal tax rates was below average 
for European OECD members (table 5). Corresponding Norwegian taxes are typically slightly  
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Table 5. Average and marginal taxes on labour for different houshold types (AW=Average 
Worker). 2011. Pct. 
  Single, no children Couple,  
two children 
  67 % AW 100 % AW 167 % AW 100+67 % AW 
Average tax Denmark 36.8 38.4 44.8 33.9 
 EU-21 37.8 41.5 46.1 35.6 
Marginal tax Denmark 40.9 42.3 56.1 42.3 
 EU-21 48.1 51.0 52.2 49.6 
Source: OECD (2012a, table I.1 og I.6.). EU21=EU countries members of the OECD. 
 
lower than in Denmark, Sweden and Finland slightly higher, but in general, taxes on labour in the 
Nordic countries are around or below European average. 
 
Now, considering incentives to emigration, one has to consider taxes plus necessary social 
expenditures. As pointed out above (table 1), what people save in taxes in low-tax countries like the 
US is typically spent on private welfare insurances and services.  
 
One should furthermore consider that those most likely to be mobile are relatively young people for 
whom childcare costs play a significant role. At this point, the Nordic countries, especially Sweden, 
are in a favourable situation since childcare costs are much lower, relative to wages, than in most 
other countries (OECD, 2011c). 
 
It is doubtful whether migration for high-skilled workers is determined by economic incentives. But 
except for people with very high incomes, there are no obvious tax/welfare motives to avoid the 
Nordic countries. If there is a brain drain problem, it is driven by career opportunities, job 
preferences, climate preferences and other factors which the welfare state can do little about.  
	
Competitiveness	of	the	Nordic	countries	
 
Finally, the economic performance of the Nordic welfare states and the corporatist welfare states in 
Northern Europe appear very convincing in the wake of the “great recession”. As revealed by table 
9.6, these countries reveal very high surpluses on the balance of payments. In the opposite position 
we find the so-called PIGS-countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece and, Spain) as well as UK and USA.  
 
When it comes to public budgets, it’s the same story, with the Nordic countries doing even better, 
comparatively speaking. Among EU Countries, only Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Luxemburg 
kept within the EU convergence criteria throughout the crisis. So did Norway and Switzerland 
which have remained outside the EU. Budget deficits have not exceeded 3 per cent of GDP at any 
time, and in Sweden, Finland and Norway there is no state debt at all. In addition, the Danish and 
Swedish state hold large but invisible assets in postponed taxes in pension savings. 
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 Table 6. Balance of payment as per cent of GDP. 
 
2010 2011 
Average 
2006-11 
Denmark  5.5 6.5 3.8 
Norway  12.4 14.6 13.8 
Sweden  6.9 7.2 7.9 
Finland  1.7 -0.6 2.3 
Iceland  -8.0 -7.1 -15.1 
Netherlands  7.1 9.2 6.8 
Belgium  1.3 -0.8 0.1 
Germany  6.0 5.7 6.3 
France  -1.8 -2.1 -1.5 
UK  -3.3 -1.9 -2.3 
USA  -3.2 -3.1 -4.1 
Italy  -3.5 -3.1 -2.7 
Spain  -4.6 -3.5 -6.9 
Greece  -10.1 -9.8 -12.0 
Portugal  -10.0 -6.4 -10.1 
Japan  3.6 2.1 3.4 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook June 2012 database. 
 
 
Table 7. Public budget deficits and net public debt. Per cent of GDP. 
 
Budget deficit/ surplus  Net public debt/ assets  
2007  2010  2011  2007  2010  2011  
Denmark  4.8  -2.7  -1.9  -3.8  -1.7  3.5  
Sweden  3.6  -0.1  0.1  -22.5  -24.0  -21.1  
Finland  5.3  -2.9  -0.9  -72.6  -65.1  -52.6  
Norway  17.3  11.2  13.6  -138.9  -164.9  -160.9  
Iceland  5.4  -10.1  -4.4  -1.0  48.3  49.7  
Germany  0.2  -4.3  -1.0  42.6  50.5  52.0  
France  -2.7  -7.1  -5.2  35.7  57.4  63.0  
Netherlands  0.2  -5.0  -4.6  27.8  34.4  39.0  
Belgium  -0.1  -3.9  -3.9  73.1  80.1  81.6  
Italy  -1.6  -4.5  -3.8  86.8  99.3  93.7  
Greece  -6.8  -10.5  -9.2  82.6  114.6  134.6  
Spain 1.9  -9.3  -8.5  17.8  40.2  48.6  
Ireland  0.1  -31.2  -13.0  -0.0  57.4  74.2  
UK  -2.8  -10.3  -8.4  28.4  53.8  68.3  
USA  -2.9  -10.7  -9.7  48.0  72.9  74.2  
Switzerlands  1.7  0.6  0.8  0.9  -2.4  -3.1  
Japan4  -2.1  -8.4  -9.5 80.5  112.8  125.5  
Euro area  -0.7  -6.2  -4.1  42.7  57.8  60.7  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook June 2012 database. 
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Baumol’s	disease	
If the “new challenges” do not by any means appear frightening in the Nordic case, one “classical” 
challenge should be mentioned. It is well-known that productivity increase is usually much higher 
in manufacture than in services. Improving productivity in welfare services is often believed to be 
particularly difficult – how can productivity be improved in child care, elderly care, teaching, 
hospital treatment etc?   
 
As wage increases tend to be uniform across the labour market – largely following the sector(s) 
exposed to international competition (Dølvik et al., 2012) –relative price of services will increase. 
As is well-known by any customer at a hairdresser, the price of a haircut as compared to industrial 
consumer products has increased over the years. If one were to increase the number of haircuts at 
the same speed as the consumption of electronic equipment like mobile telephones, i-pods, 
laptops/tablets (once considered a luxury), haircuts would swallow an increasing portion of the 
budget. As people do not multiply their consumption of haircuts, this problem does not emerge. But 
when it comes to welfare services, the standard expectation is increase at the same speed (in fixed 
prices) as private consumption or GDP. However, as price per unit increases much faster when it 
comes to services, an equivalent growth rate (in fixed prices) make welfare services swallow an 
increasing part of the total budget. 
 
Sometimes this problem is exaggerated by assuming that productivity growth in welfare services is 
zero. We know from health care that this is not the case. Still, welfare services (public or private) 
are, by their very nature, productivity laggards. This means that the growth rate (in fixed prices) has 
to be lower than overall economic growth unless one will accept an increasing proportion of GDP 
allocated to welfare services. This does not mean that welfare is doomed, or that taxes/private 
welfare expenditure is bound to approach 100 per cent of the budget. After all, if the economy 
grows by 100 per cent, one would not necessarily expect two teachers per classroom. But it 
contributes to explain why public budgets, in particular services, are always under pressure. 
Allocating most public expenditures to services, the Nordic welfare states are the most vulnerable at 
this point.  
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7.	Conclusion	&	the	political	future	of	the	welfare	state	
 
The welfare state is an inevitable concomitant of a capitalist market economy, but it has historically 
developed in different directions. These have crystallized in three institutional complementarities 
called welfare regimes. Politics matter for the establishment and maintenance of these regime 
models, but perhaps in slightly more complicated ways than suggested by the political labelling as 
Social Democratic, Conservative and Liberal. In particular, this perspective has tended to leave out 
the question how political forces work within the frame of different welfare regimes. 
 
If functionalists were right in seeing the welfare state as necessary for the surrounding society and 
in predicting an increasing share of the GDP being spent for welfare – private or public – they are 
also right in emphasizing the importance of new challenges. The welfare state has always been 
forced to adapt to contextual factors, including demography and international competition. 
 
It does not follow, however, that welfare states are forced to dramatic cutbacks because of 
demography and globalization. In the first case, the Nordic welfare states, usually considered the 
most generous ones, seem to perform better than their neighbours in this new context. Public 
budgets have remained stable even during the crisis, and big balance of payment surpluses indicate 
excellent competitiveness. As regards childcare, welfare is certainly part of the solution, not part of 
the problem. 
 
Different welfare regimes face somewhat different challenges in the future, and they are likely to 
react in different, but regime-dependent ways. The Nordic experience shows that the challenges are 
by no means insurmountable, and the experience of the US and the UK perhaps that moving 
towards a residual welfare state does not solve many problems. 
 
One major challenge is to adjust working age to the fact that people do not only live longer but also 
remain young longer. The youth period is stretched by several years as indicated by postponement 
of first childbirth from the age of 22 to the age of 29 in most of Europe, and on average, the 
biologically appropriate time for retirement is postponed by a similar number of years. 
 
Another major challenge is to increase competitiveness by prioritising social investment, especially 
education for the young generation, but also upgrading of skills, and of course research that can 
ensure innovation. 
 
These challenges may be large, but it seems difficult to argue that these challenges are larger than 
the challenges experienced by welfare states previously. It should be noticed, however, that there 
are also new social challenges. The considerable improvement of health for middle aged and elderly 
people is marked by a significant social gradient, and there are similar social challenges as regards 
the upgrading of qualification levels for the young generation. Finally, immigration may help avoid 
population decline in those countries most affected by declining fertility rates, but it also poses the 
challenge of avoiding new social divisions, and new social divisions coinciding with ethnic ones. 
 
Still, the welfare state has always been exposed to challenges, and it is questionable whether the 
challenges of the future are larger, given the current level of production and wealth, than the 
challenges of the past.  
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This does not mean that welfare states are unlikely to change. On the contrary, there might seem to 
be quite significant changes under way, not least in the Nordic welfare state. But the causes are 
political.  As it has been the case from the birth of the welfare state until now, political, ideational 
and institutional factors have been the important drivers of change. Certainly, there have been 
economic, social and other factors driving all market economies to develop some kind of welfare 
state. Moreover, we find a significant trend to convergence between developed nations as regards 
the proportion of the gross domestic product spent on welfare. But political factors determine 
whether this is state provided welfare or private welfare, political factor determine the financing, 
political factors determine the distributional outcome. This has been the case until now, and even 
though the welfare states always have to adjust to changes in the surroundings, political, ideational 
and institutional factors will definitely be the main determinants of destiny of welfare states also in 
the future. 
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